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This paper studies how firms reorganize following diversification. We propose that firms use 
outsourcing, or vertical dis-integration, to reduce scope-induced governance costs that arise 
following diversification. We also consider the source of scope diseconomies, and argue that 
different underlying mechanisms generate contrasting predictions about the link between within-
firm task heterogeneity and the incentive to outsource following diversification. We test these 
propositions using micro-data on taxicab and limousine fleets from the Economic Census. The 
results show that taxicab fleets outsource, by shifting towards owner-operator drivers, when they 
diversify into the limousine business. Moreover, the magnitude of this shift toward driver 
ownership is larger in less urban markets, where the tasks of taxicab and limousine drivers are 
similar, but compensation systems differ. The findings suggest that:  (1) firms use outsourcing to 
manage diseconomies of scope; and (2) that inter-divisional conflicts are an important source of 
scope diseconomies in related diversification. 
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________________________________________________________________________ 
1. Introduction 
Why do firms become less efficient as they increase their scope of activities?  The fields of 
corporate strategy and organizational economics propose several explanations for decreasing 
returns to scope. However, there is little empirical evidence on the origins of scope diseconomies, 
or on how firms manage the challenges of diversification. This paper sheds some light on these 
questions by analyzing how firms reorganize to reduce the costs of diversity. Our main finding is 
that diseconomies of scope cause diversifying firms to outsource formerly integrated activities.  
By focusing on reorganization, we depart from an established literature on diversification and 
performance, which asks whether related expansion outperforms conglomerate diversification 
(Wernerfelt and Montgomery 1988; Lang and Stulz 1994). Since firm performance could be a 
cause or consequence of diversification, the prior literature has produced a vigorous debate over 
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selection effects and whether diversification is a managerial mistake (Villalonga 2004). Instead of 
analyzing performance effects, we study the link between diversification and organizational 
change—specifically outsourcing—to learn about the underlying factors that link firm scope to 
governance costs. Our evidence suggests that scope diseconomies are caused by conflicts among 
agents or divisions, as opposed to the growing costs of corporate bureaucracy. 
Our theoretical framework builds on Coase (1937) and Williamson (1975) by assuming that 
firms outsource, or vertically dis-integrate, when the costs of integration exceed the costs of using 
markets or long-term contracts to govern a transaction. However, we link outsourcing to 
diversification by suggesting that coordinating activities across multiple divisions can increase 
the cost of governing a particular transaction or activity within the firm. When there are net 
benefits to diversification, but scope induced internal governance costs exceed the transaction-
cost savings that led to ex ante vertical integration, firms will diversify and outsource. Figure 1 
depicts the over-arching logic: scope diseconomies are caused by transaction or activity-level 
inefficiencies that lead firms to re-think their vertical boundaries following diversification. 
We draw on three broad theories of corporate governance to explain why internal governance 
costs increase with firm scope. First, diversification may exacerbate monitoring costs that arise 
from cognitive limitations (Penrose 1959; Schoar 2002) or incomplete information (Holmstrom 
1979). Second, diversification may increase social comparison costs when employees in a multi-
divisional firm perceive differences in the compensation or promotion practices of a new division 
to be unfair (Fehr and Schmidt 1999; Nickerson and Zenger 2008). Thirdly, diversification may 
increase influence costs, which arise when divisions engage in wasteful rent-seeking competition 
(Milgrom 1988; Rajan, Servaes and Zingales 2000), or fail to coordinate because of conflicting 
incentives (Bresnahan, Greenstein and Henderson 2009, Zhou 2009).  
Our first hypothesis predicts that diseconomies of scope create a positive association between 
horizontal diversification and vertical outsourcing. By diseconomies of scope, we mean that 
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monitoring, influence and envy costs are greater following diversification. When the marginal 
costs of diversification are greater under integration than under market or contractual governance, 
diversification should increase the probability of outsourcing. As in transaction cost analysis, we 
argue that outsourcing changes governance costs by altering the nature of the supply relationship. 
In particular, outsourcing replaces monitoring with market incentives and relaxes constraints on 
managerial attention. By moving employees outside the boundary of the firm, outsourcing limits 
within-firm heterogeneity in incentives, abilities and rewards, thereby reducing envy and social 
comparison costs. Finally, by shifting decision rights to a new entity and allowing the market to 
set prices, outsourcing replaces the influence costs of bureaucratic rent-seeking with the arms-
length bargaining and renegotiation costs that attend a contractual relationship. 
Our second hypothesis examines contrasting predictions about the mediating effect of task 
diversity (i.e., variation in physical or intellectual production processes) on the link between 
diversification and outsourcing. These competing predictions emerge from two broad 
mechanisms, which we refer to as principal-agent and inter-agent governance problems. 
Principal-agent problems emphasize conflicts between employees at different levels in a formal 
hierarchy, while inter-agent theories focus on conflict between peers. Thus, monitoring costs are 
primarily a principal-agent problem, while social comparison costs are an inter-agent problem. 
Influence cost models often combine the two mechanisms. For instance, Milgrom (1988) models 
bureaucratic rent seeking as wasteful inter-agent competition induced by a corporate principal’s 
political authority and lack of information.  
Broadly speaking, principal-agent theories predict that the marginal costs of diversification 
(under vertical integration) are increasing in task diversity, since it is harder to monitor and 
manage more heterogeneous divisions. Thus, conditional on diversification, principal-agent 
theories predict more outsourcing as functional differences between formerly independent lines of 
business increase. Inter-agent theories, on the other hand, suggest that scope induced governance 
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costs are decreasing in task diversity. For example, social comparison costs increase when agents 
in different divisions perform similar tasks but receive different incentives and rewards, leading 
to feelings of envy (Kulik and Ambrose 1992; Festinger 1954). Inter-divisional conflicts over 
shared resources should also grow less frequent as tasks become less similar, leading to fewer 
opportunities for coordination. Thus, conditional on diversification, inter-agent theories predict 
less outsourcing as functional differences between divisions increase. We test the competing 
predictions of principal-agent and inter-agent theories by measuring the correlation between 
diversification and outsourcing under conditions of high and low task diversity.  
Our empirical setting is the taxicab and limousine industry.1 This industry is well suited to 
study diversification and outsourcing for several reasons. First, entry deregulation in the 
limousine market led to a wave of diversification during the early 1990s. We use pre-deregulation 
variation in local market conditions as an instrument for the post-deregulation incentive to 
diversify. Second, vertical integration, measured in terms of fleet versus driver ownership of 
taxicabs, exhibits considerable variation both within and between fleets. Third, differences in 
local market size provide a meaningful measure of task differentiation between taxicabs and 
limousines. In particular, “hails” are a significant revenue source in urban taxi markets, but are 
less important in small cities, and cannot be served by limos. We exploit the sharp difference 
between diversified firms in urban and non-urban environments to measure the mediating effect 
of task differentiation on the link between diversification and outsourcing.  Finally, since 
diversified fleets are a relatively simple example of the multiproduct firm, this setting limits 
unobserved heterogeneity in outputs, prices, incentives and internal organization that might 
otherwise bias empirical tests.  
                                                
1 We use the term limousine to describe vehicles that are often called black cars, town cars, sedans or 
executive limousines. These vehicles are distinct from “prom” or stretch limousines. Since we exploit 
variation across many distinct local markets, this paper could also be thought of as a study of hundreds of 
similar taxicab and limousine industries. 
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Our baseline empirical tests show that diversifying firms outsource more intensively than firms 
that choose to remain focused. Specifically, diversifying firms outsource an additional 30 percent 
of the assets (i.e., taxicabs) in their legacy business compared to non-diversifiers. Moreover, 
conditional on diversification, the shift toward owner-operator drivers is less pronounced in 
markets where there is more task differentiation. Doubling the population density of a local 
market leads to an 11 percent reduction in outsourcing at a diversified firm—suggesting that 
inter-agent costs are the primary source of scope diseconomies in our empirical setting. Since we 
do not measure governance costs directly, our interpretation of these facts rests on a revealed 
preference argument, i.e. the assumption that firm boundaries reflect the relative costs of 
alternative governance modes. Nevertheless, we argue that our findings provide strong evidence 
that diversifying firms outsource in response to diseconomies of scope. 
To provide additional context for the statistical results, we interviewed a series of taxicab fleet 
managers. These managers suggested that diversification into limousines creates substantial 
efficiencies, particularly in dispatching operations. However, diversifying firms faced 
considerable operational challenges when combining non-owner taxicab drivers with a more 
professional group of limousine drivers. The problems ranged from driver suspicion that fleets 
would steer better rides to limousines, to incidents of ride “scooping” where a taxi driver would 
race to pick up a customer and create the impression that no limousine had been dispatched. Thus, 
managers of diversified fleets indicated a preference for contracting with owner-operator taxi 
drivers, whose skills and backgrounds are closer to a limousine driver’s, making them easier to 
manage and a more appropriate source of spare capacity for the limousine segment. Together 
with the statistical evidence, our field interviews point towards inter-agent conflicts, and 
particularly social comparison costs, as the underlying driver of scope diseconomies. 
This study makes four main contributions to the literature on diversification and the scope of 
the firm. First, we show that outsourcing is an important organizational strategy for managing the 
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increased governance costs associated with diversification. Thus, we connect the literature on the 
costs of diversification to a literature that emphasizes efficient organizational adaptation through 
resource redeployment and asset divestiture following diversification (Capron, Dussauge and 
Mitchell 1998; Capron, Mitchell and Swaminathan 2001).2  Second, we show that inter-agent 
conflicts in general, and social comparison costs in particular, are an important source of 
diseconomies of scope, using both qualitative evidence and a novel statistical test for 
discriminating between alternative sources of scope induced governance costs.  Third, by linking 
changes in the horizontal and vertical boundaries of the firm, we take a small step towards 
integrating the literature on diversification as an organizational strategy (Teece 1980; Levinthal 
and Wu 2006) with organizational economics’ longstanding emphasis on buyer-supplier relations 
(Macher and Richman 2008). Finally, our main findings have a broader normative interpretation: 
diseconomies of scope at the transaction or activity level can make it difficult to manage parallel 
divisions with different priorities, processes or incentive schemes, even when operational and 
market similarities create aggregate economies of scope. 
2. Diseconomies of Scope, Diversification and Outsourcing 
In this section, we develop a simple theory where diseconomies of scope lead firms to 
reconsider their vertical boundaries following diversification. We assume diversification is 
exogenous, but rational: firms only diversify if they expect synergies to be greater than costs. 
However, diversifying firms do more than simply combine operations. They also reorganize to 
minimize frictions or capture efficiencies created by the merger. While reorganization might take 
a variety of forms, our theory emphasizes outsourcing, or vertical dis-integration, as a way to 
manage increased governance costs.3 One of our key messages is that by studying the link 
between diversification and outsourcing, we can draw inferences about the size and nature of 
                                                
2 For a review of the literature on the costs of diversification see Montgomery (1994). 
3 Outsourcing does not imply that payments flow in a particular direction.  For example, a firm might 
outsource upstream manufacturing operations (in which case it would pay for the inputs) or a downstream 
sales force (in which case it would be paid for the outputs). 
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scope diseconomies. We begin by developing this broad idea, before describing the underlying 
causes of scope diseconomies and proposing a set of hypotheses. 
Figure 1 provides a stylized illustration of our theoretical framework. In the figure, two 
vertically integrated firms merge and subsequently outsource the activities of one downstream 
division. Diversification is motivated by upstream economies of scope, while outsourcing 
alleviates increased governance costs created by combining downstream activities. The figure 
highlights several aspects of our theory. First, the unit of analysis is a group of related 
transactions or activities, and the objective is to draw a set of boundaries (and choose a set of 
governance mechanisms) that maximize total surplus.  Second, we apply the term diseconomies 
of scope to any increase in governance costs caused by diversification.  Thus, diversification can 
produce diseconomies of scope but still be rational, as long as it generates even greater synergies 
elsewhere. Finally, our framework links scope diseconomies to both transactions and activities, 
which are often omitted from studies of diversification and vertical integration respectively.  
The mechanism behind Figure 1 is straightforward. If diversification produces a larger increase 
in governance costs under vertical integration than under market or contractual governance, then 
the probability of outsourcing should increase. Put differently, diversifying firms will outsource 
activities that produce large negative spillovers across divisions. This argument is closely related 
to the familiar logic of transaction cost analysis. Empirical tests of transaction cost economics 
typically assume that internal governance costs are fixed and look for a positive correlation 
between outsourcing and asset specificity, or some other factor that increases the relative costs of 
market governance. We assume the costs of market governance are fixed—or at least 
uncorrelated with diversification—and interpret a positive correlation between diversification and 
outsourcing as evidence of increased internal governance costs.4 This idea can be formalized, as 
                                                
4 Assuming that the costs of market or contractual governance are fixed with respect to a change in scope is 
different from assuming that those costs are small. A weaker (but still sufficient) assumption is that the 
marginal costs of diversification are larger under vertical integration than under outsourcing; though see 
Gibbons (2005, section 3.2) for a critique of this approach. 
8 
Authors: Evan Rawley and Timothy S. Simcoe 
Article submitted to Management Science; manuscript no. MS 00319-2008 
 
  
we show in the appendix using a simplified version of Milgrom and Roberts’s (1990) model of 
complementarities.5  However, in order to understand the deeper links between diversification 
and diseconomies of scope, we need to unpack the specific mechanisms that produce these added 
costs. The literature on firm governance suggests three different explanations for scope 
diseconomies: monitoring, rent-seeking and envy. 
Monitoring costs arise from centralized oversight of divisions, and are the main focus of the 
literature on diversification. We conceptualize monitoring costs more broadly than simply 
bureaucratic costs, which will arise whether divisions are managed jointly or as separate firms. In 
particular, monitoring costs include the opportunity costs of using a common set of people and 
processes to manage a heterogeneous portfolio of businesses. Thus, diversification may increase 
monitoring costs if increased scope exacerbates the cognitive or informational constraints on 
corporate management.  For example, one source of monitoring costs is managerial distraction, an 
idea that dates back at least to Penrose (1959). Her central argument is that a corporate manager’s 
job is to monitor divisions, and that this task grows more difficult with the number, size and 
variety of business units. Because a manager’s cognitive capacity is limited, increasing the scope 
or diversity of operations increases the probability they will make poor strategic decisions that 
will negatively impact the operations of their business units. Schoar (2002) provides empirical 
support for the managerial distraction hypothesis, finding that when manufacturing firms 
diversify into new segments the productivity of their existing plants tends to fall. 
Incomplete information can also lead to monitoring costs. Since the early moral hazard models 
of Jensen and Meckling (1976) or Holmstrom (1979), many studies have examined how a 
corporate principal might optimally respond when the agent who runs a division takes hidden 
                                                
5 Diversification and outsourcing are complements if the marginal returns to outsourcing increase with 
scope. The appendix shows that the assumption of complementarity is both necessary and sufficient to 
produce Hypothesis 1. Moreover, when the marginal cost of diversification under market governance is 
zero, complementarity is formally equivalent to diseconomies of scope. 
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actions or holds private information.6 Specific answers to that question range from monitoring to 
incentive contracts to delegation and job design.  However, a common thread is that incomplete 
information makes the agency relationship costly to manage. If the severity of the underlying 
information problem depends on the scope of a firm, then these principal-agent models yield a 
theory of scope diseconomies.  
A second broad explanation for diseconomies of scope is that agents in a diversified firm waste 
resources seeking preferential treatment from the corporate center.  For example, Milgrom and 
Roberts (1988) conceive of corporate politics as a rent-seeking process, where division-level 
agents take actions that are privately beneficial, but unproductive for the firm as a whole. 
Corporate managers seek policies that discourage these behaviors (e.g. through budgeting or 
transfer pricing), but a CEO’s authority and lack of commitment power invite lobbying by 
divisions who hope to skew the rules of the game. While the incomplete-information principal-
agent problems described above are often an important component of influence cost models, we 
place influence costs in a separate category because they emphasize inter-divisional interactions 
and inefficiencies. In particular, rent-seeking incentives depend on both monitoring costs and the 
actions taken by agents in other divisions.   
Rajan, Servaes and Zingales (2000) develop an empirical test for influence costs in the capital 
budgeting process. They find that increased diversity, measured as variation in the asset-weighted 
Tobin’s q of a firm’s divisions, is correlated with inefficient investment decisions.  Specifically, 
firms invest more heavily in divisions with low values of Tobin’s q. Their argument for indexing 
influence costs to diversity draws on the monitoring cost component of the theory: they assume 
that returns to lobbying increase as divisions grow more heterogeneous, since corporate managers 
are easier to mislead when they have a less comprehensive understanding of a division’s 
                                                
6 Some authors would draw a conceptual distinction between monitoring costs, and problems of moral 
hazard (hidden action) or adverse selection (hidden information). We group them to highlight the shared 
emphasis on costly information acquisition by an uninformed principal. While similar informational 
problems may be a necessary condition in the envy and influence cost models described below, those 
theories place a greater focus on alternative mechanisms as the main source of governance costs.
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operational activities. Bresnahan, Greenstein and Henderson (2009) use detailed case study 
evidence to argue that influence costs (i.e. conflicts over shared corporate resources) create 
diseconomies of scope that make it difficult for large incumbents to respond to major 
technological changes. 
Finally, Nickerson and Zenger (2008) develop a third theory of scope diseconomies that 
emphasizes employees’ taste for fairness, as in Fehr and Schmidt (1999). They argue that 
variance in compensation tends to produce a group of agents who envy their better-paid peers and 
consequently engage in a variety of inefficient behaviors, including “reduced effort, (engaging in) 
influence activities, departure, non-cooperativeness or even outright sabotage” (p.1431). This 
theory of inter-agent conflict builds upon research in social psychology (e.g. Festinger 1954; 
Adams 1965) that describes the origins of individual perceptions of inequity and highlights the 
importance of endogenous reference groups.  Extending this earlier research, Kulik and Ambrose 
(1992) suggest that firm boundaries are a natural point of reference for employees, who are much 
more sensitive to inequities within a firm than between firms. Furthermore, diversification 
integrates activities where both pay structures and pay levels are distinctly different, which 
provides fodder for envious feelings. Thus, by combining agents who perform similar tasks but 
have different compensation systems, incentives and ability levels, diversification can lead to 
increased envy across divisional lines, and unproductive behavior by disgruntled employees.   
We build on theories of monitoring, influence and social comparison costs by linking 
governance costs to the scope of the firm, and arguing that the marginal costs of diversification 
are larger under vertical integration than under market or contractual governance. The marginal 
costs of diversification are lower under outsourcing because vertical dis-integration produces a 
fundamental change in the nature of governance. Specifically, outsourcing mitigates scope 
diseconomies associated with managerial distraction costs by shifting the basis of monitoring 
from behavioral to contractual, placing operating decisions in the hands of the (now independent) 
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division. By placing buyers and suppliers under separate management, outsourcing also simplifies 
corporate oversight. Outsourcing attenuates scope diseconomies associated with influence costs, 
reducing agents’ incentives to lobby the corporate center by shifting the nature of resource 
allocation decisions from behavioral to contractual. Outsourcing also reduces rent-seeking 
incentives by placing decision rights in the hands of an independent firm. Finally, outsourcing 
shifts the nature of social comparison costs from within to between firms.  If within-firm 
comparisons are more salient to agents than comparisons to a supplier or contractor, then 
outsourcing activities performed by agents at the extremes of the incentive or skill distributions 
will reduce the overall level of envy.  Thus, by changing the nature of monitoring, influence and 
social comparison costs, outsourcing alleviates increased governance costs associated with 
diversification at the activity or transaction level. 
In summary, when diversification increases the costs of governing a bundle of related 
transactions internally, firms will rethink vertical boundary choices that were efficient 
beforehand. Our first hypothesis therefore predicts that when diseconomies of scope lead to 
increased managerial distraction, influence costs or envy, firms will use outsourcing to reduce the 
overall costs of governing the diversified firm. 
HYPOTHESIS 1: In the presence of diseconomies of scope, horizontal diversification 
leads to vertical outsourcing. 
Our second hypothesis examines contrasting predictions about the mediating effect of task 
diversity, or variation in a firm’s physical or intellectual production processes. These competing 
predictions emerge from two broad mechanisms, which we refer to as principal-agent and inter-
agent problems. Principal-agent problems focus on conflicts between employees at different 
levels in a formal hierarchy, while inter-agent problems emphasize conflicts between peers.  
Principal-agent problems are rooted in the informational problems and cognitive limitations 
that prevent a corporate principal from exercising complete control over division-level agents. In 
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practice, managers often rely on information systems and business processes to extend their span 
of control. However, the efficacy of shared systems and controls declines with task diversity, 
since they are often poorly suited to the idiosyncratic needs of a particular agent or division. 
Thus, when diseconomies of scope are caused by principal-agent problems, the marginal costs of 
diversification (under vertical integration) will increase with task diversity.  
The basic principal agent problem appears in many theories. For example, the managerial 
distraction hypothesis holds that it is harder to monitor a more heterogeneous portfolio of 
businesses, and can be viewed as an effort to explain the costs of conglomerate diversification, 
which represents an extreme case of task diversity (Penrose 1959; Schoar 2002). Monitoring cost 
theories grounded in hidden action problems will generate the same prediction if one assumes that 
increasing task diversity leads to weaker signals of division-level performance (Holmstrom 1979, 
1982). Similarly, since task diversity places corporate managers at an informational disadvantage, 
it may increase division managers’ rent-seeking incentives in a model of influence costs. All of 
these examples focus on interactions between a corporate principal and a division-level agent, and 
stipulate that a principal’s job grows more difficult as agent-level task diversity increases.  
Inter-agent problems arise from conflicts between agents over firm policies, such as 
compensation, promotion, transfer pricing, or access to shared resources. If perceptions of 
inequity or resource congestion increase with operational similarity, then governance costs 
created by inter-agent problems will rise along with task diversity. In some cases, firms can 
address the issue through a change in corporate policy. However, they will be reluctant to address 
inequities through a large pay increase for one group of employees, or if there are large 
differences in the marginal product of seemingly similar tasks performed in different divisions. 
Moreover, conflicts over inherently scarce resources (e.g. top management positions) may be 
very hard to resolve. 
13 
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Inter-agent problems arise in a variety of theories. Consider envy costs. If fully dissimilar tasks 
are rarely viewed as salient references, then increasing task differentiation should reduce the 
likelihood that workers will make inter-agent comparisons (Kulik and Ambrose 1992). Nickerson 
and Zenger (2008, p.1434) observe that the saliency of envy increases with “spatial proximity, 
degree of interaction and availability of information” to a reference group, where spatial 
proximity is broadly defined to include measures of social difference and contextualized 
measures of variation in ability (Festinger 1954). To the extent that lower task differentiation 
increases spatial proximity by narrowing the range of social differences and ability levels, while 
integration increases worker interaction and availability of information, social comparisons will 
naturally be more salient among employees who perform similar tasks within the same firm. 
(Thus, for example, we might expect more enmity between investment and commercial bankers 
who both underwrite corporate debt, than between a sales force with strong incentives and the 
employees of a manufacturing division.) Influence cost models also contain inter-agent problems. 
For example, increasing task diversity may reduce the importance of inter-divisional resource 
sharing or the efficacy of relative performance evaluation, thereby reducing the incentives to play 
organizational politics.  
To summarize, inter-agent problems make it more costly for a firm to maintain operationally 
similar activities in different divisions when heterogeneity in incentives or individual ability leads 
to a substantial divergence in compensation (Adams 1965), or conflicts over access to shared 
corporate resources. By mitigating inter-agent problems, increased task diversity can reduce the 
marginal cost of a change in scope (under vertical integration), and therefore weaken the link 
between diversification and outsourcing. 
Since the principal-agent and inter-agent mechanisms generate opposing predictions, we test 
their relative strength as a pair of competing hypotheses.  
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HYPOTHESIS 2 
H2A: When diseconomies of scope are caused by principal-agent conflicts, the impact of 
diversification on outsourcing will increase with task differentiation.  
H2B: When diseconomies of scope are caused by inter-agent conflicts, the impact of 
diversification on outsourcing will decrease with task differentiation. 
If the correlation between diversification and outsourcing is stronger when task differentiation is 
high, the evidence suggests that principal-agent problems are the primary cause of scope 
diseconomies. If the link between diversification and outsourcing is stronger when task 
differentiation is low, the evidence points towards inter-agent problems. 
We conclude the theoretical discussion with a caveat.  Our simple story of diversification and 
outsourcing holds all other aspects of the firm’s organization constant. In general, diversifying 
firms might adapt their organization in a variety of ways, and these adaptations could interact in 
complex ways. For instance, Eccles (1985) describes how firms use transfer-pricing policies to 
ration scarce resources, prevent free-riding and promote a sense of fairness. Shin and Stulz (1998) 
study capital budgeting and coordination. To address inter-agent conflicts, firms might redesign 
their promotion and compensation policies. Rather than work towards an omnibus theory that 
predicts when and how much each component of a firm’s internal governance structure will 
respond to diversification, we focus on a single margin—outsourcing—and seek an appropriate 
setting to test our hypotheses.  
3. The Taxicab and Limousine Industry 
Our empirical setting is the private-for-hire vehicle industry, or taxicab and limousine fleets. 
This industry provides a unique opportunity to study diversification and outsourcing for several 
reasons. First, in response to a wave of deregulation, many taxicab fleets diversified into the 
limousine market during the early 1990s. We show that a taxicab fleet’s propensity to diversify 
was linked to concentration levels in the local limousine market, and use that variation in initial 
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conditions as a source of exogenous variation in the incentive to diversify. Second, a ubiquitous 
regulatory requirement that limousine rides be pre-arranged produces a clear demarcation 
between the two market segments, often leading to different compensation arrangements by 
vehicle type. We argue that task diversity is higher for diversified fleets in dense urban markets, 
where taxicabs earn a greater share of revenue from hails, as opposed to pre-arranged trips. Third, 
since there is relatively little asset specificity between drivers and firms, it is reasonable to 
assume that diversification does not change the costs of transacting between drivers and fleets 
through the market, but does alter the cost of organizing the same relationship through a firm. 
This section describes the industry in greater detail, focusing on the legal factors that led to a 
wave of diversification between 1992 and 1997, and the economic factors that influence the 
decision to diversify into limousines and contract with owner-operator taxicab drivers.  
Taxicab and limousine markets are highly regulated. The number of taxicab licenses granted in 
a given market is typically fixed by a local taxicab commission, which provides medallions, or 
permits, that are associated with a specific vehicle. In most markets, these regulators also set 
prices and coordinate regular inspections. Entry into the limousine segment is considerably more 
flexible and restrictions on the number of vehicles in use are rare. However, while taxicabs can 
legally accept spot market hails from any passenger who solicits a ride, all limousine rides must 
be pre-arranged through a centralized dispatcher.  
The exclusion of limousines from the hail segment leads to some important differences in the 
organization of taxicab and limousine fleets. For example, taxicab drivers typically have stronger 
incentives than limousine drivers. A study by the Transit Cooperative Research Program (1998) 
found that 50 percent of limousine drivers are paid a fixed hourly wage and 35 percent share a 
large portion of each trip’s revenue with the firm, while 90 percent of cab drivers are full residual 
claimants; they pay a flat fee to the dispatcher and keep all of their gross receipts. This 
arrangement gives diversified firms a strong incentive to allocate their most lucrative rides to 
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limousines. When firms favor limousines over taxicabs, this contributes to a sense of alienation 
felt by taxicab drivers (Sheahan and Smith 2003).  
There are two basic types of driver in the taxicab segment:  shift drivers and owner-operators. 
Shift drivers lease cars, permits and dispatching services from a fleet. In 1990, fifty-one percent 
of the vehicles in US fleets were staffed via these day or half-day leases (TLPA 1990).  The same 
survey suggests that roughly one-third of the vehicles in U.S. fleets are leased on a weekly or 
monthly basis. Owner-operators are drivers who have purchased a vehicle and medallion, and are 
free to choose whether to contract with a fleet for dispatching services.  
Interestingly, vehicle ownership does little to change a taxicab driver’s short-term incentive to 
locate rides, since both fleet-drivers and owner-operators are typically full residual claimants. 
However, owning a taxicab and medallion may solve moral hazard problems, or promote long-
term investments to acquire industry-specific knowledge. Given the benefits of using owner-
operators, the level of fleet-ownership in the taxicab segment is at first puzzling (Schneider 
2008). However, many shift drivers are recent immigrants with very few marketable skills, who 
would find it difficult to finance a car and medallion, which can cost over $300,000 (Luo 2004).  
Before the early 1990s, the taxicab and limousine segments were kept separate through 
regulation. This situation changed in the early 1990s, following a series of legal challenges to 
local regulatory authority. One of the most famous examples was the 1993 “Freedom Cab” case 
(Jones v. Temmer) in Denver, where a small firm challenged Colorado’s broad regulatory 
authority over entry into the taxicab market (Cox 1993). Within four years of the Freedom Cab 
case, most cities (or states) had deregulated entry into the limousine segment. The practical result 
of these changes was to remove any legal or political obstacles to cross-ownership, which led to a 
broad wave of diversification. In our data, 54 percent of the taxicab fleets that survived from 1992 
to 1997 diversified into limousines during that period (see Table 1).  
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The logic behind diversification into the limousine segment is predicated on fixed cost sharing 
and cross-selling. While opportunities for cost sharing extend to a wide range of activities—from 
servicing vehicles to negotiating group rates for insurance—shared marketing and dispatch 
operations present the greatest opportunity. However, our discussions with fleet managers suggest 
that conflicts over shared dispatching also create significant organizational challenges for the 
firm.  In some cases, taxicab drivers scoop limousine dispatches by arriving in advance of the 
limousine and giving customers the mistaken impression that their limousine had been cancelled.  
Other firms reported that taxicab drivers had vandalized limousines and threatened limousine 
drivers during shift changes, accusing limousine drivers of skimming the best rides.  At a 
minimum, integration creates confusion among shift drivers over contract terms, engendering ill 
will between taxicab and limousine drivers. 7   
While the leasing system allows fleets to tap a large low-skilled labor pool, managing shift 
drivers, who are only weakly committed to their job, was often described as a major challenge, 
particularly in diversified firms. Shift drivers are often characterized as having limited knowledge 
of the city, poor language skills, and exhibit strong tendencies to engage in anti-social behavior.  
Owner-operators, by contrast, are characterized as professionals with an intricate knowledge of 
their city, who are fluent English speakers, keep their vehicle clean and in good operating 
condition, drive safely and give the impression that they take pride in their work.  
Our field research suggests that outsourcing is a common organizational strategy to reduce 
diseconomies of scope that arise from social conflicts between taxicab and limousine drivers in a 
diversified fleet.  Fleet managers invoke the difficulty of integrating shift (taxicab) drivers with 
limousine drivers as a major reason for contracting with (taxicab) owner-operators. Because 
owner-operators more readily understand the quid pro quo inherent in their contract with a 
diversified fleet, there is a reduced chance of conflict between drivers.  Moreover, owner 
                                                
7 Taxicab drivers in diversified firms pay lower lease prices because they receive fewer and less attractive 
dispatches, but this is often not well understood by the shift drivers. 
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operators’ investments in market-specific knowledge makes them less reliant on the dispatcher 
than are shift drivers and, therefore, less likely to subvert the dispatching system through 
scooping. Taken together, the professionalism and knowledge of owner-operators serves to 
simplify the dispatching system, which alleviates some of the managerial problems associated 
with an integrated taxicab and limousine business, particularly inter-agent conflicts that arise due 
to envious feelings between taxicab drivers and limousine drivers.  
4. Data and Measurement 
We use data from the 1992 and 1997 Economic Census of Transportation and Warehousing, 
which includes every taxicab (SIC 412100) and limousine (SIC 411920) firm in the United States 
with at least one employee. These data contain establishment-level information on line of 
business revenue at the six-digit industry level, number of vehicles by type (taxicab vs. 
limousine) and geographic identifiers. We focus on taxicab fleets with at least two taxicabs, 
$10,000 of taxicab revenue and at least one other taxicab fleet in their market (county).8  The 
1992 and 1997 Economic Censuses contain 1,020 and 1,106 fleets, respectively, that meet these 
criteria.9  Our panel regressions are based on a set of 560 fleets that reported complete data in 
both years. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for these fleets, which account for over 70 
percent of industry revenue and approximately two-thirds of all vehicles.  
Our dependent variable FLEETOWN is the share of all taxicabs owned by the fleet, which is 
equal to the number of taxicabs owned by the fleet divided by the total number of taxicabs 
operated by the fleet.  Table 1 shows that the mean fleet ownership rate fell from 86 percent in 
1992 to 63 percent in 1997.  We measure diversification using an indicator variable DIVERSIFY 
that equals zero for taxicab fleets with no limousines, and one for taxicab fleets with one or more 
limousines in their fleet.10   
                                                
8 Alternative samples did not change the results presented below.  
9 We discard very small establishments that the Census imputes values for, rather than surveying directly.  
10 Alternative measures, such as a threshold for the percentage of total revenue or capital in the limousine 
segment, yielded very similar results. 
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Table 1 shows a large increase in the total number of taxicabs in our sample between 1992 and 
1997.  The increase reflects the fact that many formerly independent owner-operators chose to 
contract with taxicab fleets during this time period, partly in response to increased competition 
following entry deregulation in the limousine segment.11 Our theory predicts that these owner-
operators will seek to join fleets that have diversified into the limousine segment because the 
match between an owner-operator and a diversified fleet creates more value than a match to a 
focused taxicab firm. This matching process suggests an implication of our hypotheses in terms 
of the evolution of firm-level capabilities: fleets that are vertically integrated and focused 
compete by minimizing capital investment in vehicles and managing a pool of low-skill drivers, 
while diversified and vertically dis-integrated fleets compete by establishing a brand that attracts 
the high quality rides valued by independent limousine and taxicab drivers. 
We use county-level population density as a proxy for task differentiation between the taxicab 
and limousine segments in a diversified fleet. In dense urban markets where street-hails account 
for a substantial share of all taxi-related revenue, taxicabs and limousines follow different 
processes to locate and service rides. In particular, limousines are always dispatched to pre-
arranged rides while taxicabs frequently locate spot market rides by cruising or by queuing in 
taxicab stands. In less urban markets, where most rides are dispatched through the same central 
switchboard, task differentiation between the taxicab and limousine segments is low: limousines 
are essentially taxicabs painted black. We exploit this empirical regularity to construct two 
proxies for task differentiation between taxicabs and limousines. First, we use the log of 1992 
county population per square mile (DENSITY) as a continuous measure of task differentiation. 
Second, we construct an easy-to-interpret indicator variable (URBAN) that equals one for fleets 
located in counties with population density above 4,000 people per square mile.12   
                                                
11 Independent drivers are only captured by the Economic Census when they contract with a fleet.  
12 This measure of URBAN is based on the average population density of the 1,000 largest cities (by 
population) in the United States during the last quarter of the 20th century (Kim 2007). 
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5. Empirical Strategy 
Our baseline specification is a simple linear regression in first differences. Let i index the fleets 
in our sample, and ! represent the first-difference operator (between 1992 and 1997). To test 
Hypothesis 1, we regress !FLEETOWN on DIVERSIFY and a vector of control variables X that 
might influence firms’ asset ownership decisions, including: firm size (measured by lagged dollar 
value of a firm’s capital stock); changes in local market population; changes in the share of 
taxicabs owned by other firms in the same market; changes in the number of taxicabs in other 
firms in the market; changes in the number of limousines in other firms in the market; a dummy 
for fleets that register as a corporation; and a dummy for urban markets.13  Thus, our initial 
specification is: 
(1)    !FLEETOWNi = " + #DIVERSIFYi + Xi $ + %i, 
where the parameter " measures the sample average change in FLEETOWN, and % is the 
unexplained portion of any changes in outsourcing. Since we only observe two time-periods, 
taking first-differences is similar to introducing firm fixed-effects, as either approach controls for 
unobserved time-invariant fleet-level factors that might influence the level of FLEETOWN.  
While (1) controls for correlation between diversification and time-invariant fleet-level 
unobservables that affect outsourcing, one still might be concerned about selection based on time-
varying factors. In an experimental design, we would randomly assign diversification status and 
measure ex post differences in fleet asset-ownership across the treatment and control groups. In 
practice, we observe changes in both diversification and asset ownership following a regulatory 
shift that creates new opportunities for expansion into related markets. In this setting, we might 
expect diversifiers to be those fleets who will benefit most from expanding, which could 
confound our estimates. For example, if fleets that experience a positive productivity shock 
                                                
13 Similar results were obtained using models with a full set of legal form of organization dummies. 
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expand through both diversification into limousines and increased contracting with owner 
operators, the coefficient on DIVERSIFY will be biased.  
We address the potential endogeneity of diversification by using the lagged concentration of 
limousines in a given county (CONCENTRATION) as an instrument for DIVERSIFY. Industry 
observers suggest that diversification is less attractive when there are strong limousine 
incumbents that have already developed deep relationships in the lucrative corporate segment. 
High limousine concentration also represents an entry barrier because of the increased threat of 
retaliation.14  Therefore, CONCENTRATION should be uncorrelated with factors in the error term 
that influence taxicab fleets’ outsourcing decisions, and negatively correlated with the probability 
of diversification following deregulation.  
To complement our instrumental variables analysis, we use propensity score methods 
(Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983) to control for selection bias. Specifically, we estimate a probit 
model of the decision to diversify and use fitted values from that model as estimates of the 
propensity score Prob(DIVERSIFYi = 1| Xi). We then drop all fleets that do not fall on the 
common support of the estimated propensity score distribution, and weight the included 
observations by the inverse probability of treatment to balance the treatment and control groups 
(Imbens 2004). Compared to the standard approach of adding controls to a linear regression, the 
propensity score methodology makes fewer functional form assumptions and eliminates the 
                                                
14 Our instrumental variables identification strategy would not be valid if ex ante limousine concentration 
were correlated with factors that influence the relationship between taxicab fleets and drivers in local 
markets. However, the cross-sectional correlation between FLEETOWN and CONCENTRATION was not 
significant (raw correlation of 0.04), and our informal discussions suggest that the primary factor limiting 
entry in the limousine market was access to a base of corporate customers.  Another concern might be that 
the timing or nature of deregulation is correlated with both ex ante limousine concentration and factors that 
influence FLEETOWN.  However, our discussions with local regulators suggest that deregulation was often 
carried out at the state level with little concern for variation in local market conditions. Finally, a practical 
drawback of our instrumental variable is that it only generates market-level variation; we could not identify 
any fleet-level shifters of the costs or benefits of diversification that would satisfy the exclusion restriction 
for an instrument. However, we find that our IV generates substantial between-fleet variation in practice, 
since the 560 fleets in our balanced panel operate in hundreds of different local markets.  
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influence of non-comparable control and treatment group observations that are off the common 
support of the estimated propensity score distribution.15 
Table 2 presents estimates from the probit model that we use to estimate the propensity score: 
column (1) reports coefficients and column (2) reports marginal effects at the average value of 
each regressor. Only firm size, population density and limousines per capita had a statistically 
significant effect on the diversification decision.  Columns (3) through (8) in Table 2 compare the 
sample means of X for diversifying and non-diversifying fleets, in both the full and matched 
samples. While the percentage differences are typically small, they are statistically significant for 
several variables, and trimming the sample produces only a modest improvement. This suggests 
that using propensity score weights is appropriate; though we do not expect large changes in the 
coefficient estimate on DIVERSIFY given the modest explanatory power of our first stage results. 
We test Hypothesis 2 by adding a proxy for task differentiation (DENSITY) and the interaction 
between DENSITY and DIVERSIFY to our baseline specification (1) yielding: 
(2) !FLEETOWNi="+#1DIVERSIFYi+#2DENSITYi+#3(DIVERSIFYi  x DENSITYi) + Xi $ + %i. 
For ease of interpretation, and to ensure that our results are not driven by outliers in the DENSITY 
distribution, we also estimate an alternative specification where DENSITY is replaced with the 
binary measure URBAN. 
The potential endogeneity of DIVERSIFY remains our key identification concern in model (2). 
Fortunately, our proxies for task differentiation, DENSITY and URBAN, are exogenous to the 
dependent variable !FLEETOWN, in that they are not choice variables: firms choose where to 
locate before learning that the possibility of diversification exists. Moreover, the key coefficient 
in model (2) is based on a triple-difference: #3 measures how the difference in outsourcing 
between focused and diversified fleets changes over time in more or less urban markets. Thus, 
                                                
15 Intuitively, this approach will outperform standard regression control methods when the response of 
FLEETOWN to DIVERSIFY varies with X (i.e. there is treatment heterogeneity), and X is correlated with 
DIVERSIFY. 
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time-invariant firm or market level factors that might be correlated with outsourcing are absorbed 
by first-differencing, and the main effect of density (#2) controls for any difference in outsourcing 
trends between urban and non-urban markets from 1992 to 1997. In principle, we could 
instrument for the interaction term by interacting DENSITY with CONCENTRATION, but this 
approach performed poorly in practice. Since we fail to reject null hypothesis that DIVERSIFY is 
exogenous in model (1), our estimates of model (2) are based on a simple linear regression. 
6. Results 
Figure 2 foreshadows our main result by showing that there is a strong correlation between 
DIVERSIFY and changes in FLEETOWN.  Moreover, this correlation does not appear to be driven 
by heterogeneity in fleet size, which might be the case if both diversification and increased use of 
owner operators were correlated with unobserved productivity shocks.  Figure 3 illustrates our 
second key result: the link between diversification and changes in FLEETOWN is much stronger 
in non-urban markets.  
Table 3 presents our baseline regressions, which show the impact of diversification into the 
limousine market on the asset-ownership mix of a taxicab fleet. We estimate four different 
versions of equation (1): OLS, firm fixed-effects, propensity score weighted regression and the 
instrumental variables analysis (2SLS).  Column 1 contains the baseline OLS results. The average 
change in the fleet vehicle ownership rate for diversifiers relative to focused incumbents is 
estimated to be negative 31 percent, and this effect is significant at the 1 percent level.  This 
estimate suggests that diversification accounts for roughly half of the large secular shift towards 
driver-owned cabs shown in Table 1.  
Column 2 in Table 3 presents estimates from the traditional within estimator, in part to show 
that they are not substantially different from our preferred first-differences specification. In 
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column 3, we report estimates from the propensity score model, which are indistinguishable from 
those produced by OLS.16  
Since the decision to diversify is endogenous, the results shown in columns 1-3 can only be 
interpreted as correlations.  In column 4, we present estimates from our 2SLS instrumental 
variables model, which controls for the potential endogeneity of DIVERSIFY by using 
CONCENTRATION as an instrumental variable. The first-stage relationship between limousine-
market concentration and diversification is strongly negative: the t-statistic on 
CONCENTRATION in an OLS regression is -5.4 and the first-stage F-statistic of 11 indicates a 
powerful instrument. In the second stage, the estimated change in the fleet vehicle ownership rate 
is negative 50 percent, which is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. We interpret this 
result as evidence of a causal relationship between diversification and changes in firm asset 
ownership rates in this industry. While the 2SLS point estimate is larger than the OLS estimate in 
column 1, they are not statistically different. Collectively, the findings in Table 3 strongly suggest 
that firms outsource to avoid the scope-induced governance costs associated with diversification.   
Table 4 presents tests of our second hypothesis, based on equation (2). We are particularly 
interested in the coefficient on the interaction between DIVERSIFY and URBAN, our proxy for 
task differentiation across divisions. Since our dependent variable is based on fleet ownership, a 
negative coefficient would provide evidence of outsourcing in response to principal-agent 
problems, while a positive coefficient would point towards inter-agent problems. 
Column 1 in Table 4 shows the OLS result, where task differentiation is measured using the 
categorical variable URBAN.  The main effect of diversification continues to be large, negative 
and strongly statistically significant, with a point estimate of negative 45 percent.  The point 
estimate on the interaction term is large and positive, at positive 55 percent, and statistically 
significant at the 5 percent confidence level. Thus, we find that diversifying fleets are more likely 
                                                
16 We also obtained similar results on changes in limousine ownership in limousine firms that diversified 
into taxicabs. 
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to outsource if they operate in non-urban markets, where task differentiation between taxicabs 
and limousines is low.   
Column 3 in Table 4 replaces the discrete measure URBAN with the continuous measure 
DENSITY, and finds similar results: doubling population density leads to an 11 percent increase 
in the impact of diversification on outsourcing.17  The models in columns 2 and 4 use propensity 
score matching to control for ex ante observable differences between diversifiers and firms that 
remain focused. This also has little effect on the parameter estimates.   
Overall, the results in Table 4 suggest that taxicab fleets outsource in response to inter-agent 
problems that lead to a positive correlation between task diversity and the marginal costs of 
diversification.18  This finding is consistent with our qualitative interview evidence, where fleet 
managers pointed out the importance of misunderstandings and conflicts between taxicab shift-
drivers and limousine drivers in a diversified firm.   
7. Conclusions 
This paper studies the mechanisms behind diseconomies of scope by examining how firms 
reorganize their vertical boundaries after diversifying. We show that changes in firm scope alter 
the marginal costs and benefits of vertical integration, leading firms to re-think their vertical 
boundaries.  We also investigate the mediating effect of task diversity on the diversification-
outsourcing relationship, using it to discriminate between principal-agent and inter-agent drivers 
of internal governance costs.  A major challenge for empirical work on these questions is finding 
exogenous variation in the scope of the firm. To address that challenge, we exploit a unique 
opportunity, created by widespread diversification in response to entry deregulations in the 
taxicab and limousine industry between 1992 and 1997.  
We find that diversifying taxicab fleets outsource extensively, deploying 30 percent more 
owner-operator drivers than fleets who continue to focus only on the taxicab segment, which 
                                                
17 The same results were obtained with DENSITY winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. 
18 We also replicated all of the results in this section using a Tobit specification (results omitted). 
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supports our contention that diversification leads to outsourcing in the presence of diseconomies 
of scope.  Consistent with the idea that outsourcing helps alleviate inter-agent conflict, we find 
that the link between diversification and outsourcing is stronger in less urban markets, where task 
differentiation between taxicab and limousine drivers is less pronounced.  Our interviews with 
taxicab fleet managers also suggest that envy-based conflicts are in important source of scope 
diseconomies in this industry.  
Our findings have implications for both corporate strategy and organizational economics. While 
other studies have suggested that diversification can increase governance costs, this observation is 
rarely reconciled with the idea that firms make organizational changes following diversification 
to enhance efficiency. Indeed, the conceptual basis for diseconomies of scope is often predicated 
on systematic managerial mistakes. We develop a theoretical framework based on efficient 
adaptation following diversification, and present evidence that firms’ vertical boundaries respond 
to scope induced internal governance costs. Our findings also suggest that firms’ horizontal and 
vertical boundaries are jointly determined (Argyres and Liebeskind 1999). While other studies 
have measured transactional interdependencies across vertical supply relationships (Novak and 
Stern 2007; Forbes and Lederman 2009), we believe this is the first study to provide evidence of a 
link between the horizontal and vertical boundaries of the firm. 
The existence of complementarities between diversification and outsourcing also has 
ramifications for how scope diseconomies should be analyzed.  Perhaps for analytical 
convenience, diseconomies of scope are often modeled as an increasing and convex function of 
the number of boundaries or divisions in a firm. While this leads naturally to a simple analysis of 
optimal firm size, it provides little practical guidance in a world where complex interactions 
among activities or transactions in different divisions produce significant non-linearities in the 
total costs of governance.  Our findings highlight the importance of research that unpacks the 
interrelationships amongst divisions as a source of organizational diseconomies of scope. 
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Finally, we believe this work has normative implications for corporate strategy.  In particular, 
we show that outsourcing is a tool corporate managers can use to manage increased governance 
costs that arise due to diseconomies of scope.   
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Figure 1:  Diversification and Outsourcing  
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Figure 2: Diversification and asset ownership (FLEETOWN) by firm size 
 
  
 
 
Figure 3: Diversification and asset ownership (FLEETOWN) by urban vs. non-urban 
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Table 1 – Descriptive statistics 
 
 1992 1997 
Test sample (n=560) Mean Std dev Mean Std dev 
     
FLEETOWN 0.86 0.33 0.63 0.36 
DIVERSIFY 0.00 0.00 0.54 0.50 
Taxicab revenue ($000) 675 1890 849 2739 
Taxicab capital ($000) 230 673 319 934 
Total taxicabs 24 64 35 83 
Fleets with 2 taxicabs 0.27 0.44 0.09 0.29 
Fleets with 3-5 taxicabs 0.19 0.39 0.22 0.42 
Fleets with 6-10 taxicabs 0.19 0.39 0.20 0.40 
Fleets with 11-25 taxicabs 0.17 0.38 0.21 0.40 
Fleets with 26-50 taxicabs 0.09 0.29 0.10 0.30 
Fleets with >50 taxicabs 0.10 0.30 0.17 0.38 
Taxicabs in the county 231 480 474 673 
Limousines in the county 103 228 221 414 
CONCENTRATION 0.05 0.13 0.32 0.36 
County population (000) 885 1036 985 1147 
County square miles 861 1642 878 1714 
URBAN 0.37 0.48 0.36 0.48 
Partnership 0.02 0.13 0.02 0.15 
Corporation 0.80 0.40 0.80 0.40 
     
All firms Total 1992 Total 1997 
Taxicab revenue ($M) 521 669 
Number of taxicabs 20,014 29,960 
Number of fleet owned taxicabs 16,426 18,303 
Number of fleets 1,020 1,106 
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 Table 2 – Probit model of diversification from taxicabs to limousines 
 
Dependent variable  = Diversified from taxicabs to limousines between 1992 and 1997 {0,1} 
 
    Full sample Common Support 
          
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Coef. dy/du  Focus Diver- t-test Focus Diver- t-test 
    at !   sified on !  sified on ! 
          
1992 total factor -0.05 -0.02  0.11 -0.00 1.98 0.02 -0.02 0.54 
   productivity (0.09) (0.03)  (0.05) (0.04)  (0.05) (0.04)  
          
1992 Fleet taxicab  0.17 0.07  0.89 0.83 1.95 0.88 0.83 1.65 
  ownership rate (0.22) (0.09)  (0.02) (0.02)  (0.02) (0.02)  
          
1992 log (taxicab capital) -0.86 -0.34 * 4.75 3.93 7.42 4.34 3.82 5.25 
   (0.52) (0.21)  (0.09) (0.07)  (0.07) (0.06)  
          
1992 log (taxicab capital2) 0.02 0.01  9.50 7.86 6.35 8.68 7.64 4.26 
   (0.02) (0.01)  (0.21) (0.15)  (0.20) (0.14)  
          
Partnership -0.37 -0.15  0.03 0.01 0.56 0.02 0.01 0.36 
   (0.46) (0.18)  (0.02) (0.03)  (0.02) (0.02)  
          
Corporation  0.20 0.08  0.80 0.81 -0.24 0.79 0.81 -0.64 
   (0.16) (0.06)  (0.03) (0.02)  (0.03) (0.02)  
          
1992 log (county pop.) 0.11 0.04  12.88 12.86 0.19 12.71 12.84 -1.02 
   (0.11) (0.04)  (0.09) (0.09)  (0.10) (0.09)  
          
1992 log (county pop.2) 0.00 0.00  6.15 5.73 3.67 6.06 5.71 3.02 
 (0.00) (0.00)  (0.08) (0.08)  (0.09) (0.08)  
          
Log (county miles2) -0.11 -0.04 * 3.14 2.85 1.02 3.13 2.87 0.96 
   (0.06) (0.02)  (0.22) (0.18)  (0.21) (0.17)  
          
1992 log (taxicabs  -0.03 -0.01  2.18 1.70 3.55 2.05 1.71 2.29 
  in the county-i) (0.08) (0.03)  (0.10) (0.09)  (0.11) (0.10)  
          
1992 log (limousines  -0.16 -0.06 *** 0.25 0.34 -2.27 0.23 0.35 -2.83 
  in the county) (0.06) (0.02)  (0.03) (0.03)  (0.03) (0.03)  
          
Urban 0.07 0.03  0.43 0.61 -1.41 0.44 0.60 -1.33 
 (0.26) (0.10)  (0.08) (0.10)  (0.08) (0.09)  
          
Constant 0.28 0.03        
 (1.05) (0.10)        
          
Pseudo R2 0.09         
N 560   254 306  213 292  
*** significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level 
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Table 3 – Diversification and asset ownership 
 
Dep. Variable = Change in the % of vehicles in the fleet owned by the firm (!FLEETOWN) † 
         
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  
 OLS  F.E.  Matched 2SLS†† 
         
DIVERSIFY  -0.31 *** -0.40 *** -0.27 ** -0.50 *** 
    (0.07)  (0.05)  (0.11)  (0.09)  
         
1992 log (taxicab capital) -0.03  0.21 *** -0.09 * -0.05 * 
    (0.02)  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.03)  
         
!County taxicab ownership 0.09 * 0.08  0.04  0.09 * 
   rate-i (0.05)  (0.06)  (0.04)  (0.05)  
         
!log(taxicabs in the county-i) 0.03 ** -0.00  0.03  0.03 ** 
    (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  
         
!log(limousines in the county-i)  -0.02  0.02  -0.03  -0.02  
    (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  
         
!log(county pop.) -0.13  -0.04  -0.12  -0.13  
    (0.15)  (0.10)  (0.19)  (0.15)  
         
Corporation 0.10 **   0.11 ** 0.12 ** 
 (0.05)    0.05  (0.05)  
         
Urban -0.05    -0.09  -0.05  
 (0.07)    (0.11)  (0.06)  
         
Year dummy   -0.02 **     
   (0.01)      
         
Constant 0.11  34.51 ** 0.28  0.29  
 (0.11)  (16.58)  (0.21)  (0.18)  
         
560 firm fixed effects N  Y  N  N  
R2 /Psuedo-R2 0.12  0.23  0.09  n/a  
N 560  1120  505  560  
         
2SLS 1st stage summary statistics         
F-statistic       11  
t-statistic on CONCENTRATION       -5.4  
Adjusted R2       0.13  
Standard errors are robust and clustered at the market (county) level, except in the fixed effect model where 
they are clustered at the firm level 
† In the fixed effects model (column 2) the dependent variable is FLEETOWN  
†† 1st stage of the 2SLS model:  !DIVERSIFYi = &CONCENTRATIONi1992 + Xic " + 'i 
The Durbin-Wu-Hausman test rejects the null hypothesis that the instrument is not necessary at the 1% 
level ((2= 20 in the 2SLS specification, column 4) 
*** significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level 
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Table 4 – Diversification, task differentiation and asset ownership 
 
!FLEETOWNi = a + B1)i +B2URBANi + B3()i x URBANi)+ XicBc + ei 
Dep. variable = Change in the % of vehicles in the fleet owned by the firm (!FLEETOWN) 
         
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  
 OLS  Matched  OLS  Matched  
         
DIVERSIFY (!) -0.45 *** -0.46 *** -1.03 *** -1.11 *** 
    (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.20)  (0.22)  
         
DIVERSIFY x URBAN 0.55 ** 0.57 ***     
     (0.17)  (0.19)      
         
URBAN -0.20 ** -0.20 **     
 (0.09)  (0.10)      
         
DIVERSIFY x LOG     0.11 *** 0.11 *** 
  (1992 POP. DENSITY)     (0.03)  (0.04)  
         
LOG(1992 POPULATION     -0.03 * -0.04 * 
   DENSITY)     (0.02)  (0.02)  
         
1992 log(taxicab capital)  -0.03  -0.08 * -0.03  -0.08 * 
  (0.02)  (0.04)  (0.02)  (0.04)  
         
!County taxicab  0.06  0.07  0.06  0.08 * 
   ownership rate-i (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.05)  
         
!log(taxicabs in the county-i) -0.00  -0.00  -0.00  -0.00  
    0.01  (0.02)  0.01  (0.02)  
         
!log (limousines in the 0.01  0.02  0.01  0.01  
     county-i) (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  
         
!log (county pop.) -0.00  -0.00  -0.00  -0.00  
 (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.00)  
         
Corporation 0.10 ** 0.11 ** 0.10 ** 0.11 ** 
 (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.05)  
         
Constant -0.14 ** -0.14 ** 0.04  0.06  
 (0.06)  (0.05)  (0.09)  (0.10)  
         
R2  0.18  0.18  0.18  0.18  
N 560  505  560  505  
         
Standard errors are robust and clustered at the market (county) level 
*** significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level 
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Appendix: A Model of Diversification and Outsourcing 
 
This appendix develops a simple analytical framework that illustrates the link between 
diseconomies of scope, diversification and outsourcing.  Suppose there are two lines of business 
that could be horizontally integrated (M=1) or managed as independent firms (M=0).  One line of 
business has a two-stage production process where downstream activities could be vertically 
integrated (N=1), or outsourced (N=0). For simplicity, the other line of business is always 
integrated, so there are two boundary decisions:  one “vertical” and the other “horizontal.”  Joint 
expected profits are written as *(M,N).   
 
To analyze outsourcing, we define the net benefits of vertical integration as a function of scope 
V(M)*(M,1) - *(M,0), and an exogenous fixed cost ev that is only incurred under vertical 
integration. The probability of vertical integration is then Pr[V(M) > ev], reflecting the Coasian 
(1937) logic that boundaries are determined by the relative cost of markets and hierarchies. 
 
To analyze diversification, we define scope economies as a function of vertical integration X(N)  
*(1,N) - *(0,N). For fixed prices and quantities, X(N) >0 is equivalent to sub-additivity of the 
cost function; a sufficient condition for mergers to be efficient (Baumol 1977, Evans and 
Heckman 1984). If diversified firms pay an exogenous fixed cost ex, the probability of a merger is 
Pr[X(M) > ex]. 
 
Many studies treat diversification and outsourcing as independent decisions. That would be true if 
both V(M) and X(N) were constant, so changes in firm scope have no impact on vertical 
integration (and vice versa). Figure A.1 illustrates this scenario, where firms cannot move from 
horizontally focused and vertically integrated (M=0, N=1) to diversified and outsourced (M=1, 
N=0) without changing both V and X, or (equivalently) ev and ex. 
 
When diversification changes the net benefits of vertical integration, we say there are 
complementarities, defined as DX(0) - X(1) = V(0) - V(1). When D=0, both X and V must be 
constant, and we are back to the situation depicted in Figure A.1. When D < 0, diversification 
lowers the returns to outsourcing. We focus on the case where D > 0, so the benefits of 
outsourcing increase following diversification (perhaps because of increased conflicts at a 
particular stage of the production process, as discussed in the text). 
 
When D > 0, there is a straightforward link between diversification and outsourcing. Specifically, 
since D > 0 implies that the net benefits of vertical integration are decreasing in scope, a switch 
from M=0 to M=1 must lower the probability of vertical integration. Figure A.2 illustrates the 
choice of firm boundaries when diversification and outsourcing are complements.  Note that firms 
can move directly from horizontally focused and vertically integrated (M=0, N=1) to diversified 
and outsourced (M=1, N=0) by crossing the diagonal line segment. We can use this simple cost 
benefit framework to state a more general version of Hypothesis 1.  Specifically, 
 
Hypothesis A.1: Diversification (increasing M) causes outsourcing (decreasing N) if and only if 
they are complements (D>0). 
 
Proof: Diversification causes outsourcing ! Pr[N=0|M=1] > Pr[N=0|M=0] ! Pr[V(1) < ev] > 
Pr[V(0) < ev] ! V(0) > V(1), since V(M) is independent of ev ! D>0. 
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To see the relationship between Hypothesis A.1 and diseconomies of scope, suppose that X(N) 
can be separated into an upstream piece Xu that does not depend on N, and a downstream part Xd 
that does. Further, assume that diversification has no impact on (joint) downstream profits unless 
there is vertical integration; so that *d(0,0) = *d(1,0), or equivalently Xd(0) = 0. This implies that 
D  X(0) – X(1) = -Xd(1) = *d(0,1) – *d(1,1), which will be positive if and only if diversification 
reduces downstream profits under vertical integration. We refer to this reduction in expected 
profits from merging vertically integrated downstream divisions as diseconomies of scope. 
 
Scope diseconomies are less general than complementarities. In particular, Hypothesis A.1 says 
that under very weak assumptions (i.e. boundary choices maximize *) our empirical results imply 
that diversification and outsourcing are complements. To interpret the same results as evidence of 
scope diseconomies, somewhat stronger assumptions are required; specifically, Xu does not vary 
with N and Xd(0)=0. Similar assumptions are standard in the empirical literature on buyer-
supplier relationships19 and we argue that they are reasonable in our empirical setting. Moreover, 
evidence of complementarities may be interesting in its own right (Argyres and Liebeskind 1999). 
 
Since D measures diseconomies of scope (the costs of merging integrated downstream divisions), 
our second hypothesis can be stated in terms of cost shifters. Suppose Z is an index of task-
diversity. In the text, we argue that changing Z has different implications for D under different 
theories about the source of scope diseconomies. These predictions can be summarized as: 
 
Hypothesis A.2.A: Principal agent problems lead to D(Z) increasing in Z. 
Hypothesis A.2.B: Inter-agent problems lead to D(Z) decreasing in Z. 
 
Before concluding, we offer two comments. First, Figures A.1 and A.2 highlight the importance 
of finding exogenous variation in M for our empirical tests.  In particular, when the unobserved ex 
and ev are negatively correlated, diversification and outsourcing will be positively correlated, 
even if M and N enter expected profits independently, as in Figure A.1.  Thus, we can only test 
the hypothesis that D>0 by finding some source of variation in M that is uncorrelated with these 
unobserved variables, and asking whether that variation also leads to a change in outsourcing. 
 
Second, Milgrom and Roberts (1990) and Athey (1995) have shown how to generalize this simple 
cost-benefit framework to larger systems with many complementary business practices. Our 
assumption that D>0 corresponds to their concept of super-modularity, or increasing differences 
in expected profitability. Unfortunately, more complex models can only deliver sharp predictions 
when all of the relevant business practices are pair-wise complementary, so the number of 
assumptions (or interaction terms in an empirical setting) grows very large as one moves toward 
corporate restructurings that involve many divisions, each with many vertical stages. 
 
Additional appendix references 
Athey, S. (1995), “Product and Process Flexibility in an Innovative Environment,” RAND Journal of 
Economics, 26(4), 557-574. 
Baumol, W.J.  1977.  On the Proper Costs Tests for Natural Monopoly in a Multiproduct Industry.  
American Economic Review 67(5) 809-822. 
Evans, D.S., J.J. Heckman.  1984.  A Test for Subadditivity of the Cost Function with an Application to the  
Bell System.  American Economic Review 74(4) 615-623. 
 
                                                
!"#For example, to measure transaction costs, one typically assumes that asset specificity changes the costs 
of contracting without altering the costs of hierarchy. 
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Figure A.1:  Independent Boundaries (D=0)   Figure A.2:  Complementarities (D>0) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
